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Abstract 
This paper examines some of the European Union (EU) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
legal issues that emerge for the United Kingdom’s (UK) public procurement law and policies 
following Brexit. It analyses the consequences and sequencing of international negotiations that will 
now have to take place because the UK has triggered Article 50(2) of the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU). For once the UK revokes the European Communities Act 1972, it will no longer be 
obligated to follow either the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or the EU 
Procurement Directives. Nor will the UK be subject to the commitments the EU has signed up to 
on behalf of the UK in the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and in its Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs).  
After looking at the legal issues concerned with sequencing, the paper moves on to assess the 
domestic, centrifugal forces that will also impact on the UK’s public procurement law post Brexit. 
For under the Devolution Settlement of 1998, the competence for public procurement was 
devolved down to the regions of Scotland, Northern Ireland, England and Wales. The paper 
postulates that the legal issues of disintegration that have surfaced under Brexit could potentially 
fragment a coherent UK wide procurement policy, competition and value for money internally; as 
well as externally towards the WTO GPA, the EU and other regional procurement agreements.  
The paper puts forward a competition approach to address some of the potentially negative 
consequences of Brexit undermining value for money, transparency and integration in the UK’s 
lucrative markets for government procurement. It concludes with the limited hope that the legal and 
economic issues and challenges since the UK’s referendum on membership of the EU will be a 
salutatory lesson for all other nations. 
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Introduction 
 
Government procurement is both a significant economic and government activity. Since 2006, 
public procurement has increased 10-fold and the World Bank expects this growth trajectory to 
continue.2 For example, China's government procurement market totalled approximately $88 billion 
in 2008, more than triple the amount in 2003. The EU’s procurement market was worth over €1500 
billion, over 16 per cent of total EU GDP in 2004, and grew to over €2150 billion in 2008.3  In 
2013/14, the UK public sector spent a total of £242 billion on procurement of goods and services. 
This sum accounted for 33% of UK public sector spending4 and 13% of GDP,5 so ensuring good 
public procurement policy benefits markets, good governance, citizens and tax payers.  
Currently, the UK’s procurement laws fall under the application of the EU’s 2014 Procurement 
Directives for Goods and Services, Utilities and Concessions. The EU has also negotiated the 
coverage of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement on behalf of all 28 EU Member States, 
and various RTAs, including the EU-Canada CETA with a comprehensive chapter of public 
procurement provisions. Following Brexit, the UK’s Great Repeal Bill seeks to repeal the European 
Communities Act 1972 and incorporate current applicable EU law into an Act of Parliament. The 
government will then decide whether to repeal, amend or retain individual measures from the day 
the UK officially leaves the EU. So, post-Brexit, the UK will no longer be legally obligated to follow 
either the EU Directives, nor will it be subject to the commitments the EU has signed up to on 
behalf of the UK in the WTO GPA or other RTAs.  Nevertheless, the paper argues that until 
Brexit, the UK is not only constrained by its good faith obligations towards the EU, but further that 
the UK also currently lacks its’ own schedules as an independent Member of the WTO, from which 
it can trade from. This situation poses legal challenges with economic repercussions.  
Domestically, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will impact on procurement laws and policies 
internally, with important consequences for the UK regions of Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales.  For while the Great Repeal Bill converts EU law into national law, it should be recalled that 
following the Devolution Settlement of 1998, some EU laws relate to competences that have been 
devolved within the UK down to these regions – and public procurement is one of these devolved 
competences. Therefore, unless the laws affecting these devolved subjects, including procurement, 
are unilaterally scrapped by the UK government, the Great Repeal Bill will result in transposing 
legislation on devolved matters. This could fragment a coherent UK wide procurement strategy 
towards the WTO GPA, the EU and other bilateral or regional procurement agreements. The paper 
therefore puts forward a competition response to the fragmentation of procurement laws, policies 
and markets before concluding that at the very least, the experience of the UK under Brexit should 
serve as a strong lesson for all other countries. 
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Section 1: Sequencing After Brexit: International Law and the Principle of Good Faith 
 
Although since the EU Referendum the UK government has been entering into informal 
discussions regarding its future trading arrangements – including public procurement - with key 
third parties, the UK will not possess the legal competence to sign any trade agreement until it has i) 
withdrawn from the EU and ii) repositioned itself with regard to both the WTO and the EU itself. 
The UK is constrained by its good faith obligations towards the EU, which are applicable until the 
UK has detached itself from these laws. Additionally, under WTO rules for both goods and 
services, every Member is obligated to provide its most favoured nation treatment (MFN) in market 
access to the other WTO Members. One of the few exceptions to this is through establishing a free 
trade area (FTA) or customs union that is, among other things, more trade liberalising. It therefore 
on a practical level, it would be difficult for the UK to attempt to negotiate a preferential FTA 
without having already formalised the UK’s tariff rates or market access levels have must be 
established under the WTO’s most favoured nation treatment for trading.  
 
Using this analysis, the following sections look at the sequencing of the negotiations the UK faces 
having triggered Article 50 TEU. 
 
 
Article 50 
 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements. 
 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period. 
 
… 
 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to re-join, its request shall be subject 
to the procedure referred to in Article 49.  
 
(Emphasis added) 
 
 
 
When the UK government triggered Article 506 pursuant to Article 50(2), the UK entered a two-
year window during which it needs to detach itself from the European Union, so that it can then 
seek to renegotiate a ‘New EU-UK Partnership’ in its place.7 Article 50 TEU is therefore primarily 
                                                      
6 Article 50 was triggered by the UK Prime Minister Theresa May on March 29th 2017 in a letter to the 
European Council President Donald Tusk. See www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-
letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50 (accessed 19/09/2017) 
7  “... we want to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two year 
Article 50 process has concluded. From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of 
implementation, in which the UK, the EU institutions and Member States prepare for the new 
about withdrawing from the EU, it is not about negotiating trade or procurement commitments - 
with either the EU or other trading partners.8 Indeed, to conclude such agreements before it has 
withdrawn from the EU would have both legal and operational ramifications.  
 
First, to conclude a trade agreement while the UK is still formally a Member State of the EU would 
be in breach of Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, which provides the EU with exclusive competence in 
determining common commercial policy on behalf of its Member States. Serious conflicts of 
interest would also likely surface, which would also be in breach of TFEU Article 24.3: 
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unre-
servedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in 
this area.  
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or 
likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, Article 4 TEU emphasizes that  
 
3. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member 
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties. 
…. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's 
objectives. (Emphasis added) 
 
 
It has been countered that this is the least serious ramification, for the EU would not have many 
sanctions available to deter or to compel the UK to refrain from such action, this article opines 
otherwise.9 Legally, such a move would conflict with the principle of good faith towards the TFEU 
until it detaches itself from the EU. Good faith is a fundamental principle of international law 
codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states that 
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.” 10  Moreover, without good faith, surely all international law would collapse? 
 
After the UK leaves the EU, the EU will still be the world’s largest market and the UK’s biggest and 
nearest trading partner. The EU is more important to the UK’s economic well-being than any other 
trading partner and therefore the UK has an overriding economic interest in accessing the EU 
market on preferential terms. As such, the UK needs to secure and maintain the good will of the 
EU to have sufficient time to ensure the best outcomes for the UK’s transition away from the EU. 
This is a significant consideration. Much of the expertise and capacity necessary to manage such 
multi-dimensional negotiations does not currently exist within the UK – primarily because it has 
been developed at and for the EU. These specialisms have been developed with the explicit 
objective of advocating, implementing and developing the EU - they have been not advanced to 
dismantle it. The principle of good faith emerges here as an important diplomatic tool. For the 
                                                                                                                                                             
arrangements that will exist between us, will be in our mutual interest.” UK Government White 
Paper, 2017. 
8 Jan Wouters. Brexit and trade: what EU and WTO rules imply. A Bruegel Event. February 6, 2017. 
http://bruegel.org/events/brexit-and-trade-what-eu-and-wto-rules-imply/ 
9 See E. Szyszczak. Triggering Article 50 TEU: a positive result for the government? UKTPO Blog see: 
blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2017/01/26/triggering-article-50-teu-a-positive-result-for-the-government/ 
(accessed 19/09/2017) 
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1969. Section i: Observance of Treaties, Article 26.  
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf 
Article 50(3) TEU withdrawal process gives the EU an advantage over the UK - not least because 
the two-year negotiation period can only be extended by a unanimous European Council decision.  
 
Yet over and above these objections, the UK needs to detach itself from its current position within 
the EU and reposition itself anew independently under the framework of the WTO. For it is only 
once this WTO Membership has been formalized that the UK will be able to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with the EU or any other country or trading bloc. This sequencing has led to a palpable 
concern surfacing about the period between withdrawal from the EU and re-positioning itself 
outside of the EU – or ‘cliff edge.’ It is increasingly acknowledged11 that the government needs to 
provide a transition period of legal certainty until new domestic laws, policies and trading standards 
have been established. Nevertheless, the Government’s 2017 White Paper categorically stated that 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU would not be either as a single market or a customs union 
- for this would entail a common external tariff and the loss of UK’s freedom to negotiate its own 
trade agreements independently of the EU.12 It will be an intriguing “new strategic partnership” 
with the EU, including “a wide reaching, bold and ambitious free trade agreement” and “a mutually 
beneficial new customs agreement with the EU... .”13   
 
 
 
1.1 RTAs, the WTO and the UK’s Most Favoured Trading (MFN) Status 
 
The legal framework for negotiating a free trade agreement remains primarily the WTO’s legal 
exceptions to its MFN obligations in goods and services pursuant to Article XXIV GATT and 
Article V GATS respectively. Therefore, a crucial initial element of repositioning the UK’s trade 
terms post-Brexit is going to involve establishing the UK’s MFN commitments at the WTO with all 
the existing 164 plus Members - including the EU - before it can seek formal regional or bilateral 
exceptions to these MFN obligations. The UK’s MFN rates are also significant because after Brexit, 
the UK as an independent WTO member, will have its exports subject to the EU and the other 
WTO Members’ MFN tariffs. Given that the WTO has made far less progress than the EU in 
liberalising trade in services (and notwithstanding the high-water mark between bound and applied 
tariffs), the UK’s services suppliers would have reduced access to EU markets.14 
 
Some commentators have argued that the UK is already a WTO Member with independent rights 
and obligations, including those relating to its MFN coverage in goods and services.15 This seem to 
be an optimistic interpretation - particularly in the case of services under the GATS schedules, 
where the UK’s commitments are set out both independently and jointly with the EU. The EU will 
need to remove the UK’s commitments from its schedules and the UK will need to set out its own 
schedule of commitments. This is required whether or not the UK’s GATS schedule is certified by 
other WTO Members or not – simply because the UK needs a schedule from which to trade 
upon.16  
 
In sum, it is not until the UK has formally determined its MFN coverage under the WTO and set 
out its services commitments independently of the EU that the UK can seek to negotiate an RTA or 
Customs Union covering goods and services, pursuant to the MFN exceptions under the GATT 
                                                      
11 The 2017 UK Labour Party Manifesto states that  Labour recognises that leaving the EU with ‘no deal’ is 
the worst possible deal for Britain and that it would do damage to our economy and trade. We will reject ‘no 
deal’ as a viable option and if needs be negotiate transitional arrangements to avoid a 'cliff-edge’ for the UK 
economy. Published May 16 2017. See: http://www.labour.org.uk/index.php/manifesto2017/brexit (accessed 
19/09/2017) 
12 This has been an irritant for Turkey under its customs union with the EU. See: K. Dawar & S. Togan. 
Updating EU-Turkey Trade and Investment Relations? 
13 Government’s 2017 White Paper, para. 12.2. Note 8. 
14 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/36277 
15 L. Bartels. The UK's Status in the WTO after Brexit (September 23, 2016).  Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841747 
16 P. Eckhout. House of Commons Briefing Paper: Brexit: the options for trade. para 192. 
Article XXIV and GATS Article V – either with the EU or other trading partners. The same 
sequencing applies to other sectors, which includes - public procurement.  
 
 
2. The UK as an Independent Party of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
 
In terms of the UK’s membership of the WTO GPA, it is also only after the UK re-establishes its 
position under the WTO’s multilateral agreements that it can seek to renegotiate its schedules of 
market access coverage under the plurilateral WTO GPA. This is because the WTO GPA’s 
coverage of the procurement of services has a specific ‘relationship of correspondence’ with the 
coverage set out under the GATS schedules - to the extent that the WTO GPA Members cannot 
make commitments of procurements for certain services - unless they have been previously 
included under their GATS schedules. 17  That is, the WTO GPA sets up the framework for 
introducing international competition into procurement markets, transparency and fair award 
processes and procedures for its signatory parties’ tendering contracts for goods and services – it is 
not responsible for “opening up” markets for the access of such goods or services. 
 
So, it is only once it has set out its independent schedules under the WTO GATT and GATS, that 
the UK then has the possibility to negotiate its new position in the WTO GPA, or procurement 
chapters in its RTAs. For as a plurilateral agreement, country needs to join the WTO GPA before it 
can include procurement chapters in FTAs. However, given that the value of market access under 
the WTO GPA is greater than any other existing FTA, 18  the UK would access international 
procurement markets far more quickly and efficiently if it were to join the WTO GPA. It could then 
use its schedules under the WTO GPA as the basis for improving upon the WTO GPA benchmark 
during regional and bilateral negotiations.  
 
 
 
2.1 The UK’s Accession to the WTO GPA 
 
The WTO GPA is a plurilateral agreement housed within the framework of the WTO, with 
voluntary membership for existing WTO Members. The fundamental aim of the WTO GPA is to 
mutually open-up government procurement markets to competition among its parties, based on 
non-discrimination, transparency and integrity. The WTO Secretariat administers the agreement and 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is applicable for solving disputes between the 
parties concerning the implementation of the agreement. Given that the EU was a regulatory 
pioneer in procurement and advocate of public procurement liberalization under the previous 
GATT Procurement Codes, the WTO GPA is based on some key EU concepts surrounding the 
appropriate design and execution of procurement contracts. The 2014 Revised GPA also exhibits 
the more recent influence of the EU in the design of the right to appeal clauses, the judicial review 
mechanism, and e-procurement, for these were all part of previous EU legislation. As a result, the 
current UK procurement regime is highly compatible with the existing GPA legal framework.19 
                                                      
17 Dawar, Kamala (2017) The government procurement agreement, the most-favored-nation principle, and regional trade 
agreements. In:  Georgopulos, Aris C, Hoekman, Bernard and Mavroidis, Petros C (eds.) The 
internationalization of government procurement regulation. Oxford University Press. 
18 It is estimated that the GPA parties have opened procurement activities worth an estimated US$ 1.7 trillion 
annually to suppliers from GPA parties offering goods, services or construction services. See: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm (accessed 19/09/2017); See Robert D. Anderson, 
Philippe Pelletier, Kodjo Osei-Lah and Anna Caroline Mu ̈ller. Assessing the Value of Future Accessions to 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): Some New Data Sources, Provisional Estimates, 
and an Evaluative Framework for Individual WTO Members Considering Accession. WTO Staff Working 
Paper Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-15. 6 October 2011.  
19 The total value contracted by the 28 Member States of the EU and covered by GPA in 2012 was EUR 
283.4 billion. Bilateral UK-EU procurement-related trade can be estimated at around 15% of the total value of 
procurement, or close to 2.5% of GDP. This includes both direct and indirect cross-border procurement-
Until Brexit, the UK remains a party to the 2014 Revised WTO GPA through its membership of 
the EU. When the UK leaves the EU, the EU Procurement Directives will no longer be applicable 
in the UK, even if they continue to be followed. The EU will consequently need to remove the 
UK’s coverage from the EU’s WTO GPA schedules by notifying the other parties to the WTO 
GPA of any proposed modifications to their commitments, pursuant to Article XIX. Under the 
WTO GPA, Article XIX Modifications and Rectifications to Coverage stipulates that a Party shall 
notify the Committee of any proposed rectification - whether it be a transfer of an entity from one 
annex to another, or the withdrawal of an entity or other modification of its annexes to Appendix I. 
Further, the Party proposing the modification must include evidence as to the likely consequences 
of the change in its notification. Removing the UK from the EU’s schedules will therefore entail re-
negotiating the EU’s coverage with all the current GPA parties. While the EU’s notification to 
remove the UK’s procurement after Brexit is unlikely to be controversial, there will be obvious 
ramifications caused by the gap in the value of the EU’s schedules after the removal of the UK 
schedules. The EU’s need either to modify its schedules and market access commitments on the 
basis of reciprocity, or compensate the other parties to the WTO GPA on the loss of coverage 
follow the UK’s detachment. The UK alone accounts for 84 % of the total value procured at EU 
level in awards of more than 100 million euros.20 
However, it is unlikely that the UK will be able to simply rollover its current coverage as part of the 
EU because there are elements of the UK’s coverage that are tied into EU procurement directives. 
For example, under Annex 2, the EU’s sub-central government entities coverage includes regional 
or local contracting authorities. These are bodies governed by public law as defined by the EU 
procurement directive. However, the Annex only sets out indicative rather than clearly defined 
coverage for each Member State.21 This suggests that before the UK can negotiate its own coverage 
under the GPA, the UK will again first need to re-negotiate its relationship with the EU.  
 
Once the EU has removed the UK from its schedules and the UK has reset its relationship with the 
EU, the UK can decide to become an independent party to the WTO GPA and access the 
significant value of scheduled procurement markets of the 47 countries. However, it is most likely 
the UK will have to apply to join as with any other accession country. For pursuant to Article XXII 
of the 2012 WTO GPA Protocol, the 1996 WTO GPA agreement entered into force only for those 
governments who have, “by signature, accepted the Agreement on 15 April 1994, or have, by that 
date, signed the Agreement subject to ratification and have subsequently ratified the Agreement 
before 1 January 1996.” 22 The UK did not sign this agreement as an individual party, and as a result 
it is not a separate signatory party to the WTO GPA, with the right to individual membership after 
Brexit. 
 
 
2.2 WTO GPA Negotiating Modalities 
 
The WTO GPA depends on highly complex bilateral negotiations between the different Parties and 
a signatory party is not required to give the same commitments to all trading partners. From its 
inception, the plurilateral Government Procurement Code sought to address the free-rider problem 
with conditional reciprocity. The WTO GPA’s Annexes 23  are negotiated along four basic 
                                                                                                                                                             
related tradeThis is approximately £85 million. Albert Sanchez Graells. Written evidence for UK Parliament. 
(TAS0083) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-
internal-market-subcommittee/brexit-future-trade-between-the-uk-and-the-eu-in-services/written/44483.pdf 
20 Albert Sanchez Graells. Written evidence for UK Parliament. (TAS0083) Op cit.  
21 See WTO Webpage: 
egpa.wto.org/en/Annex/Details?Agreement=GPA113&Party=EuropeanUnion&AnnexNo=2&ContentCult
ure=en (accessed 19/09/2017) 
22 Adoption of The Results of The Negotiations Under Article XXIV:7 of The Agreement on Government 
Procurement, Following Their Verification and Review, as Required by the Ministerial Decision Of 15 
December 2011(GPA/112), Para 5. 
23 The coverage of the Agreement is set out for each signatory party in Appendix I, which is divided into 
Annexes concerning the specific coverage of the obligations. The Annexes address: 1) central government 
parameters, consisting of: i) the value of procurement - covering only contracts estimated to exceed 
a certain value threshold; ii) the identity of the procuring entity - covering only those listed by each 
party in its annexes; iii) the type of goods or services procured - consisting of all goods, apart from 
some expressly excluded by each party, and only services listed by each party in its annexes; and iv) 
the origin of the goods or services - including only countries that are GPA parties.  
 
Consequently, during WTO GPA negotiations, not only must the UK decide which services and 
goods and construction are covered by the obligations, but it must also negotiate which contracting 
authorities or entities will be included in the Annexes and then, additionally, the financial value of 
the thresholds that will trigger the scope of application of the agreement in each category of 
procurement.  Parties to the GPA also commonly qualify the scope of the coverage of their 
obligations within their Annexes to Appendix 1. Although this strict reciprocity approach to 
negotiations addressed the free-rider problem among WTO GPA parties, the OECD has estimated 
that if the GPA commitments were applied on an unconditional MFN basis, the average level of 
GPA commitments would be 16% higher in market access value than with strict reciprocity.24  
 
 
2.3 The WTO GPA and Domestic Policy Objectives: the case of EU SMEs 
In the legislative procedure leading to the adoption of the 2014 EU Procurement Directives, one of 
the main focuses was to improve the participation of SMEs in public procurement covered by the 
EU rules.25 Approximately 20.8 million SMEs are registered in the EU, representing 99.8% of all 
enterprises, and SMEs produce more than a half of European GDP.  The final 2014 Directive, 
Recital 2 states that:  
 
‘Public procurement plays a key role in the Europe 2020 strategy … For that purpose, the 
public procurement rules adopted pursuant to [the 2004 Directive] should be revised and 
modernised in order to increase the efficiency of public spending, facilitating in particular 
the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)’.  
 
Article 83(3) of the 2014 Directive provides for increased monitoring at the national level and for an 
obligation on Member States to transmit to the Commission every three years a monitoring report 
covering information on, inter alia, the level of SME participation in procurement contracts.  It is 
therefore surprising that the 2014 Procurement Directives contains few rules that can substantively 
promote the participation of SMEs in EU level competitions for public contracts. The challenge for 
the EU is that it is legally constrained by the WTO GPA when promoting or protecting SMEs in 
those government procurement markets covered by the agreement. For while the WTO provides ex 
ante options for the parties to negotiate to promote their SMEs and various parties have inscribed 
such possibilities in their Annexes, it is significant for the legality of EU SME promotion in 
procurement markets, that the EU has not.26  
 
From the very outset of the negotiations to the 1994 WTO GPA, the EU did not seek to negotiate 
carve out protections from the GPA’s obligations for SMEs and it did not aim to negotiate 
                                                                                                                                                             
entities covered by the Agreement; 2) covered sub-central government entities; 3) "other" covered entities 
(e.g. utilities); 4) goods; 5) services coverage; 6) coverage of construction services; and 7) General Notes. 
24  Asako Ueno. Multilateralising Regionalism on Government Procurement. OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 
151. 2013.  
25 As defined under the Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36). This focus was initiated in the Commission’s 
Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, and was clearly visible in 
the Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement 
Market, COM(2011) 15 final and was one of five main aims in the 2011 Proposal. 
26 Dawar, Kamala and Skalova, Monika (2016) The evolution of EU public procurement rules and its interface with 
WTO: SME promotion and policy space. In: Sanchez Graells, Albert and Skovgaard Ølykke, Grith (eds.) 
Reformation or deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
concessions that matched the SME objectives of other parties. This is because the internal EU 
(then, the European Community) procurement directives were promulgated to liberalize the internal 
market among its Member States. The rationale underlying the Procurement Directives, and 
therefore the principles embodied in the Directives, are historically based on trade liberalization.27  
Moreover, not only did the EU not fully exercise its potential to exclude SME’s from the scope of 
the access to the EU’s public procurement market, EU negotiators rather sought to explicitly 
discriminate against and penalise the United States (US), Korea and Japan for their promotion of 
SMEs under their respective GPA Appendix 1 Annexes. The EU’s Notes to Annex 1 stipulate that:  
The provisions of Article XVIII requiring Domestic Review Procedures shall not apply to 
suppliers and service providers of Japan, Korea and the US in contesting the award of 
contracts to a supplier or service provider of Parties other than those mentioned, which are 
small or medium sized enterprises under the relevant provisions of EU law, until such time as the EU 
accepts that they no longer operate discriminatory measures in favour of certain domestic small and minority 
businesses (emphasis added).28 
 
This historical stance has placed the EU at odds with the policy objectives of most other WTO 
GPA parties, as well as more recent EU efforts to promote SMEs in procurement markets under 
the WTO GPA and its RTAs. Under Brexit, the UK has the option of avoiding this legal constraint 
on promoting SMEs or other horizontal policies through procurement, ex ante, when negotiating its 
accession terms to the WTO GPA. These negotiations will reset the UK’s procurement 
commitments and exceptions, which can then be built upon in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements. In effect, the UK is now able to negotiate a comprehensive policy framework to 
promote SMEs, or other sectors of the economy, in line with other parties such as the US, Japan 
and S. Korea.  
 
However, given the new decentralised policy space that will emerge following Brexit, it is worth 
restating that in recent history, the primary objective of procurement policies has been “value for 
money” as defined as “the best mix of quality and effectiveness for the least outlay over the period 
of use of the goods or services bought”.29 This should be achieved through competition, unless 
there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Promoting horizontal policy objectives through 
procurement contracts will typically detract from the pursuit of competition and value for money. 
Careful cost benefit analyses should be undertaken to ensure there are compelling reasons for 
compromising value for money in public procurement, in the pursuit of secondary or horizontal 
goals.  
 
This paper therefore now puts forward a competition approach to government contracting, which 
could be achieved by placing the supervision of public procurement law enforcement within the 
UK’s central competition agency.  
 
 
 
3. Options for UK Public Procurement Law and Policy 
 
The UK’s procurement policy has been towards promoting competitive, commercial public 
purchasing. The UK government has noted that public markets are often uncompetitive in that they 
fail the tests of economic models that require features such as perfect information and low barriers 
to supplier entry and exit.30 A 2000 White Paper stressed how this was particularly so in the market 
                                                      
27 For discussion, see S. Arrowsmith, ‘The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the 
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for communications networks where high barriers to entry for new businesses, economies of scope 
and scale, networks effects, and technical gateways or bottlenecks … may give their owners market 
power.31 The UK has also been an internal critic of the EU’s proposed regulation to impose a price 
penalty on bids from countries that did not offer strict reciprocity in that procurement market on 
the grounds that it suppressed competition.32 Overall, the UK has played a positive role in shaping 
EU procurement rules along commercial rather than bureaucratic lines.33 
Nevertheless, prior to the implementing the EU procurement directives, the UK did not have a 
significant body of public procurement law or legal rules. Rather it relied in the main on 
administrative guidance from the Treasury for specific purposes, such as promoting value for 
money and controlling corruption in procurement processes. It was actually the EU Procurement 
Directives that brought about a more legal approach in UK procurement practices, through their 
transposition into domestic law. To the extent that the objective of EU procurement law is to open 
the internal procurement market to tenderers from all other Member States, this transposition has 
introduced greater competition and promoted value for money – which is in line with previous UK 
procurement policy. Under the Great Repeal Act, a pragmatic short-term solution would be to 
retain current regulations for the award procedures but without conferring their benefits to suppliers 
from third parties without reciprocal arrangements.  
 
However, more national freedom will affect the UK internally, in its relationship with Scotland, 
Ireland and Wales. To recall, this is because of the devolution settlement of 1998, when public 
procurement became an area of responsibility for the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Following Brexit, the different regions of the UK will no longer be forced to 
apply the same rules, and different horizontal policy objectives are likely to appear in procurement 
processes, promoting different local economic development and social objectives. The value of 
procurement in the regions is significant. Greater policy freedom could lead to a greater divergence 
between the different regional jurisdictions of the UK. This centrifugal dynamic could operative 
undermine legal coherence, as well as competition and value for money in post Brexit procurement 
processes within the UK, particularly if the different regions follow different horizontal policy 
objectives through their procurement processes. 
 
3.1 Horizontal policy objectives Post Brexit: The case of SME Promotion 
 
In UK, there is political pressure to use low-value procurement to promote SMEs. In 2013/14, the 
UK public sector spent a total of £242 billion on procurement of goods and services; this which 
some suggest could be used t to pursue a variety of public policy aims, such as promoting small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or encouraging local growth. Both objectives were stated aims of 
the UK’s coalition government of 2010-2015, which set and met a target for central government to 
procure 25% of goods and services by value from small and medium-sized enterprises, in 2013/14. 
The 2015 Conservative manifesto included a pledge to increase the percentage spent with small and 
medium-sized enterprises to a third.34  
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Following Brexit, the UK could negotiate certain carve outs for its small medium sized enterprises 
along the same lines as the US, Japan and S. Korea, and list them in its schedules of market access 
commitments in the WTO GPA. This would allow certain devolved regions of Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland to pursue such policies, even if others chose otherwise. To further promote 
transparency and increase competition, the UK should also set up a centralized electronic data 
collection system and public tender awards centrally, based on the existing EU TED system, or 
more advanced e-procurement systems such as in South Korea. 
There are also other policy objectives that the devolved regions of the UK may choose to pursue 
through public procurement awards. A 2013 study based on EU TED data,35 assessing the use of 
public procurement for promoting the environment – or green public procurement (GPP), social 
responsible public procurement (SRPP) and public procurement for innovation indicates that the 
UK is the leader in all three categories.36 Although, the absolute value of these procurements was 
higher in France and the Netherlands. This suggests that the UK, as the signatory party of any 
agreements signed in the WTO GPA or FTAs, will need to ensure the legality of such policies not 
only under their negotiated schedules in any potential membership of the WTO GPA, but also 
under other multilateral rules including the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures and the GATT and GATS National Treatment Obligations.  
In the recent Canada –Feed-in-Tariff37 and India – Solar Cells disputes,38 the local content requirements 
implemented with the aim of promoting renewable energy were scrutinized under WTO GATT, 
Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMs) and ASCM rules, but not the WTO GPA. 
This indicates that even if the UK were to negotiate certain exemptions for the purposes of 
promoting specific industries or regions under the WTO GPA, this will not exempt the measures 
from other non-discrimination commitments for goods and services under the WTO’s multilateral 
agreements, including the GATT, TRIMs, GATS and ASCM. 
 
 
4. Promoting Competition: an integrated approach? 
There is growing consensus that ensuring non-discriminatory, transparent and fair public 
procurement is the best way for citizens and tax-payers obtain the best public goods and services 
available, and at the best value for money. To achieve this aim, more competition is needed in 
procurement markets. One way to realize this is to bring the competition authority and the 
procurement agencies closer together. However traditionally, and specifically in the UK, 
government procurement laws have been perceived as largely focused on eliminating public 
restrictions to the circulation of goods and services associated with protectionist measures by other 
governments. Competition law, on the other hand, is perceived as largely focused on private 
restraints of competition that damage consumers and contestable markets. Under this ‘classical’ 
perspective, very limited interaction between competition and government procurement law is 
envisaged. Both bodies of economic regulation seem to have different objectives and, consequently, 
seemed to offer weak reasons for their joint study or for the development of consistent rules and 
remedies.39  
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Nevertheless, the influence of competition’s economic principles is evident – most notably in the 
area of bid rigging amongst tenderers for public contracts. 40  This field concentrates on the 
economic impact of procurement on competition, including the so-called buyer power.41 Such work 
stresses the importance of preventing procurement processes being affected by egregious practices 
such as collusion, fraud and corruption. 42  The complexity of the competition effects from 
procurement markets results in the public sector both promoting and restricting competition, either 
by helping firms to overcome barriers to entry or by adopting procurement practices that restrict 
participation or discriminates against particular firms.43 The interdependent nature of competition 
and procurement laws is also apparent in the impact of government procurement activities in the 
prospective analysis conducted in merger control cases, or on the impact of subsidies in public 
markets. These issues determine the competitiveness of markets where the public buyer sources 
goods, works and services, and can constrain the ability of the public buyer to obtain allocative 
efficiency and value for money.  
In the EU, Article 101 TFEU clarifies the targets of competition law in two stages with the term 
undertaking. Any entity engaged in an economic activity that consists of offering goods or services on a 
given market, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed, is considered an 
undertaking. To qualify, no intention to earn profits is required, nor are public bodies, by definition, 
excluded.44 In effect, this term is used to describe nearly anyone that is engaged in an economic 
activity,45 except employees46 and public services based on "solidarity" for a "social purpose.” A 
public undertaking, on the other hand, is an undertaking over which public authorities directly or 
indirectly exercise dominant influence by their ownership, financial participation, or the rules that 
govern it. 47  Fenin v. Commission 48  noted that the Community courts' traditional approach for 
establishing whether a public body is an undertaking turned on the concurrent application of two 
tests: (i) the comparative criterion and (ii) market participation tests. The first test focuses on 
whether the activity of a public body is capable of being performed by private operators. The 
potentially all-encompassing scope of this first test is reined in by the market participation test. This 
determines whether those activities are conducted under market conditions. It distinguishes between 
conduct undertaken with the objective of capitalisation, and those activities pursued solely pursuant 
to the principle of solidarity. For where the activities of the Member State are typically those of a 
public authority, they will not be considered an undertaking subject to Article 101 TFEU.  
In so far as a public entity undertakes an economic activity that could be separated from the exercise 
of its public powers, this entity, in relation to that activity, acts as an undertaking. However, if that 
economic activity could not be separated from the exercise of its public powers, the activities 
exercised by that entity as a whole, remain activities connected with the exercise of those public 
powers.49 The fact that the product or a service supplied by a public entity and connected to the 
                                                      
40 Weishaar, S.E., Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement. Edward Elgar. June 2013. 
41 The Bundeskartellamt. Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives. See: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/Vergaberecht_e/vergaberecht_eW3DnavidW2643.php 
42 Public Procurement: The Role of Competition Authorities in Promoting Competition. The OECD. 
DAF/COMP. 2007:34. 
43 See for example, Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1994) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 
MIT Press, London. They contend that procurement is a special case of regulation in which the roles of 
principal (regulator or designer of contract mechanisms) and buyer are combined; The UK Office of Fair 
Trading. Assessing the impact of public sector procurement on competition. Volume 2 – case studies 
(OFT742b). September 2004.  
44 The Commission published this definition on DG Competition’s web-site at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/u_en.html#t62 
45 Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979 (C-41/90). 
46 See AG Jacobs, Albany International BV (1999). 
47 A dominant influence of public authorities is presumed when they: a) hold the major part of the 
undertaking's subscribed capital, b) control the majority of the votes attached to shares issued by the 
undertaking or c) are in a position to appoint more than half of the members of the undertaking's 
administrative, managerial or supervisory body. 
48 Case C-205/03 P. Advocate General Maduro in Fenin v. Commission. 
49 Case C-113/07 P, Selex ßSistemi Integrati v. Commission [2009]. 
exercise by it of public powers was provided in return for contractual remuneration rather than 
determined, either directly or indirectly - by that entity - is not sufficient to classify the activity as 
economic or the entity as an undertaking.50 
Significantly, this TFEU approach effectively pushed most government procurement activities 
outside of the application of the competition rules under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  Government 
procurement under this approach is deemed to be an ancillary to a non-economic activity, which 
disqualifies it from the economic activity regulated under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This is 
regardless of the anti-competitive distortions that government procurement activities may affect, 
and moreover, which may impact both public and open markets. There is, therefore, an 
asymmetrical approach in the competition rules accorded to EU public and open markets. This 
undermines a more coherent integrated approach to regulating these markets. 
More recent EU case law has moved closer towards an competition approach, in the 2015 EasyPay 
case.51 Here the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) deviated from the Fenin approach 
when imposing the requirement that economic and non- economic activities must be inseparably 
connected for the latter to exclude the former from competition law analysis. 52 This built on the 
approach taken in the AT Bettercare II case53 involving the conduct of a local authority in Northern 
Ireland that was procuring nursing home places from private companies whilst also providing some 
places itself. The UK Competition (Commission) Appeal Tribunal found that the local authority 
was acting as an economic undertaking in its purchasing activities – and thus covered by EU 
competition law. It rejected earlier theories of the UK Office of Fair Trade which, in the approach 
taken under Fenin, sought to split the activities in question between "economic activities" and "non-
economic activities" on the basis of a distinction between provision and purchasing, or according to 
the source of funding used by each resident. 
The UK could choose to reinforce the reasoning behind the EasyPay and successfully appealed Cat 
BetterCare II judgements, by conclusively departing from the economically and legally fragmented 
approach taken in the Fenin case. It could additionally seek to house the public procurement agency 
under the supervision of the competition authority. For this could help to ensure that public 
procurement benefits society and the participants in markets. This would allow for centralized 
competition analysis of procurement policies in the devolved regions of the UK and serve to ensure 
a harmonized negotiating policy for external trade agreements. These supervision activities could be 
prioritized with an orientation towards illegal direct award of contracts. For example, in Sweden, the 
Public Procurement Act of 2010 provides the Swedish Competition Authority the possibility to take 
cases of illegal direct award of contracts to court. Moreover, a company that infringes the 
Competition Act risks being debarred from bidding for procurement contracts. Likewise, in the 
Czech Republic the Office for the Protection of Competition is the central authority of state 
administration responsible for creating conditions that favour and protect competition, supervision 
over public procurement and consultation and monitoring in relation to the provision of state aid. 
For the UK to follow such an integrated approach would be beneficial, to both competitive open 
and procurement markets, legal certainty and enforcement – and moreover in an era of legal and 
economic uncertainty under BREXIT.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
And now I saw, though too late, the folly of beginning a work 
before we count the cost, and before we judge rightly of our 
own strength to go through with it. 
Robinson Crusoe. 
 
 
This paper has examined the sequencing of negotiations that needs to take place following the 
unprecedented triggering of Article 50 TEU by an EU Member State. It submits that even if, 
although highly unlikely, the UK can simply roll-over its existing MFN commitments in the WTO, 
overlooking joint EU-UK schedules, it will still need to formally reset these with the WTO 
membership before it can seek to negotiate its accession to the WTO GPA, or other bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. These negotiations will necessarily involve the EU and could be 
protracted and highly politicized, particularly if the UK breaches its good faith obligations towards 
the TFEU before it detaches its Membership. That is, and with specific regards to procurement, 
while in theory there is little reason why other WTO GPA parties would wish to re-open the 
existing detailed coverage arrangements with the UK, the other parties - including the EU - must 
nevertheless agree to the UK’s accession and its coverage as set out in its Appendix 1 Annexes.  
 
If the UK were to recast its procurement procedures under the framework of the WTO GPA, it 
would still have some flexibility to re-calibrate its procurement rules. However, this greater freedom 
to pursue horizontal policy objectives could also lead to greater divergence between the different 
regional jurisdictions of the UK - because of the Devolution Settlement of 1998. Such regional 
diversity could operate to undermine legal coherence; economies of scale, competition and value for 
money in post Brexit procurement processes within the UK.  
 
This paper submits that one way of checking and balancing these regional developments is to 
establish coordinated measures to foster competition and value for money in procurement policies. 
This could include, at the limit, integrating the competition and public procurement agencies 
together within a single agency competent to address anti-competitive practices such as bid rigging, 
merger control and State aid that affect both open and public procurement markets. This agency 
could also seek to coordinate domestic horizontal policy objectives such as SMEs, in procurement 
processes to ensure that they are proportionate to meet their stated objectives, and do not 
undermine the very policy objective they intend to meet. It seems, therefore, that the lessons learned 
from the UK since the EU referendum, is that what should be a discussion concerned with 
improving competition and value for money in the UK, will more likely be overshadowed by a 
complex legal process of sequencing negotiations, intra-UK regional jurisdictional divergences, and 
intractable political, financial and diplomatic legacies with the EU.  
 
